

DISCUSSIONS

The Arches and the Spandrels

A Response to Kenneth W. Kemp (2)

Michał Chaberek

In his book *The Edge of Evolution*, Michael Behe draws on a metaphor of arches and spandrels. The arches are what hold a cathedral together, and spandrels are the “fillings” that may carry beautiful ornaments; however, they have no say in whether a building stands or collapses (Behe 2007, 171–203). Behe explains that it is similar to life—some minor and non-substantial elements of living organisms can be explained by neo-Darwinism, but the complex biochemical systems, which are essential for the survivability of any living organism—cannot. Thus, neo-Darwinism may explain the spandrels but not the arches of life. I think Behe’s metaphor can be taken more broadly and applied to the context of our debate. Here, I will understand it as a mental attitude by which one focuses on the irrelevant spandrels while at the same time pretending to be unable to grasp the arch (“core” or “essence”) of a problem.

In his response, Professor Kemp reduces my critique to four points (P1–P4), which he claims we disagree on and shows why—in his view—I am mistaken. Here, I will order my response according to his four points (2024, 391):

The argument that such a vision is required goes something like this:

(P1) Scientific evidence shows that there was never a time in which there were only two human beings, the ancestors of all other human beings) (= scientific polygenism).

(P2) Catholic theology teaches that there was once a time in which there were only two human beings, the ancestors of all other human beings (= theological monogenism).

So: (P3) With respect to human origins, what scientific evidence shows contradicts what Catholic theology teaches.

So: (P4) Catholic theology has to be revised.

Ad P1

I said in my first critique: “Had [Prof. Kemp] adopted a ‘healthy’ science and faith relation, such as the one proposed by Augustine, he would never have had a need to challenge monogenism in the first place” (Chaberek 2024, 156). By this, I mean that there is a methodological arch delineating the scope of science on which all the spandrels of particular scientific concepts hinge. Kemp focuses on the spandrels completely missing the point. So, let me reiterate my point. I quoted Augustine, who says:

When they [enemies of Christianity] produce from any of their books a theory contrary to Scripture, and therefore contrary to the Catholic faith, either we shall have some ability to demonstrate that it is absolutely false, or at least we ourselves will hold it so without any shadow of doubt. (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, I, 21, 41)

Now, Kemp is quite certain that polygenism is an open question for Catholic theology; therefore, Augustine’s phrase “contrary to the Catholic faith” would not apply in this case. I’ll address this problem in Ad P2. Here, it is important to highlight one thing: If there were a situation in which a certain claim (i.e., proven beyond any doubt) about nature would oppose a given interpretation of Scripture or Catholic belief then this belief should be abandoned, because Christians cannot contradict facts of nature. (Kemp rightly observes [2024, 397] that in my critique, I used the word “dogma” in a generic sense, as “something that is believed,” from the Greek δόγμα—“opinion,” “tenet.”)

A clear example of such a situation is found in Galileo’s case. A common belief of his contemporaries was that Scripture taught the immobility of the Earth. Now, living aside all the circumstances and reservations that I mentioned elsewhere (2021, 58–69), the gist of the issue is that science has proven beyond any doubt that the Earth, after all, is in motion. Therefore, the common Scriptural belief had to be abandoned, and the Church had to admit that the Inquisition condemning Galileo was wrong. Obviously, the immobility of the Earth and the mobility of the Sun were not an object

of any clearly defined dogma, but nevertheless, these tenets were justified scripturally and philosophically. The second part of the 1616 condemnation reads:

The earth is not the center of the world, and not immobile, but moves according to the whole of itself, and also by diurnal motion. *Appraisal*: All have said, this proposition to receive the same appraisal in Philosophy [foolish and absurd]; and regarding Theological truth, at least to be erroneous in faith. (Santillana 1955, 121)

Augustine says that Catholics should disprove a theory contrary to faith but even if this is not possible they should still cling to faith against the theory. But in the case of the mobility of the earth, we are not dealing with a theory anymore but something that can be directly¹ observed in real-time; therefore, contradicting it would go against reason.² This is precisely what Augustine means when speaking about Christians who talk nonsense about nature when they contradict things “certain from reason and experience” (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, I, 19, 3).

Drawing on the analogy with Galileo we can judge the issue of polygenism in science. The healthy understanding of the relation between faith and science (the one expounded by Augustine) allows us to modify our religious claims only when things that contradict our belief are “certain from reason and experience.” I am sure that Prof. Kemp would agree with me that the scientists’ claim that the origin of humanity from a single couple is impossible due to the genetic evidence is far from being “certain from reason and experience.” But there is more to it, both regarding the (A) actual state of science and (B) the very capacity of scientific research.

(A) *Actual state of science*

As I pointed out in my critique, no given study actually excludes the physical possibility of tracing back the human genome into a single pair. Even Ayala’s study implies that it could have happened, just the time needed (about 30M years) is ridiculously too long to accept it (1994, 6789). So Ayala’s

1. Surely, one could say that using a telescope makes an observation indirect.

2. And I do think that Robert Sungenis with his “geocentrism” and “geostatism” makes fideistic claims. Now, whether we can build a cosmological model that would allow for math to work as well with geocentrism as with heliocentrism, or without any “centrism,” is a whole different story. Contrary to what Sungenis says, the fact that today’s science makes room for pretty much any interpretation does not support Sungenis’s claim that Catholics are obliged to believe in geocentrism and geostatism (Sungenis and Bennett 2007, 590–91).

study, indeed, disproves a single couple, but only indirectly, and this exclusion is totally dependent on his assumptions; it does not follow from any “physical” constraints inherent to human genomes, as most people think, and as Kemp incorrectly suggests. Ayala had taken effort to ensure that his conclusion would preclude (indirectly) a single couple origin. To obtain his results, he had carefully chosen the DNA locus and instilled other assumptions to get what he wanted. I pointed out in my critique that Prof. Kemp did not scrutinize the science with an eye on saving traditional faith in monogenism, which is a *sine qua non* condition of a healthy Catholic attitude. Today, we have several studies not only showing the biased approach of Ayala but also presenting alternative models that allow to genetically reduce humanity to a single couple within quite a reasonable timeframe. For instance, one research team claims:

This demonstrates that human genetic data (at least as summarized in the allele frequency spectrum and simple linkage disequilibrium statistics) from non-sex chromosomes is consistent with at least two different but parsimonious models of human origins from a single couple. The model without diversity of the first couple dates to about 2mya ago, whereas the model with primordial diversity has a first couple that lived about 500kya ago. Thus, we show that using assumptions commonly used by evolutionary geneticists, a single-couple origin is possible, despite claims to the contrary. (Hössjer and Gauger 2019, 11)³

Therefore, as I said in my critique, there is no scientific reason to tinker with the traditional Catholic belief, because science is ambiguous and has not settled anything contrary to the traditional belief. The fact that most Catholic philosophers and theologians do not know it (or do not want to know it) does not change the reality. It may only point to the fact that we have poor and biased science education which, by default, favors the alleged scientific challenges to traditional Christianity keeping silent over the scientific alternatives.

As a clarification: Prof. Kemp says that I misunderstood Ayala’s paper by thinking that it precludes the tracing of just the SNPs to a single couple. Well, I am not sure if I framed my argument entirely clearly on this point, but first, I explained why Ayala’s type of challenge is not quite realistic (Kemp does not respond to this one), and secondly, I explained why the SNPs type of challenge fails. In his critique, Kemp brings up a third type of argument, that is, the spectacular similarities in the human and chimpanzee genomes.

3. Cf. Hössjer, Ola, Gauger, Reeves 2016.

Since the simian origin of man is not a matter of our polemics, here I will just say that this argument is not less illusory than the other ones.

(B) *Capacity of scientific Research*

What I said would be enough for Catholics to stick with the traditional monogenism, but I believe an extra point should be made. Since any study of the ancient past, by the very nature of the question, must be indirect, i.e., by observing the effects and processes currently in operation, no claim about the distant past would ever have such certainty (and authority) as the claims about currently observed events and processes in nature. In other words, the Galileo case—by the very fact that there is a substantial difference in the question asked—can never happen with the origin of man.⁴ We simply do not have a time machine to travel a few million years back to observe how humanity emerged. Indeed, we can observe in real-time the movements of planets, but we cannot observe the origin of species.⁵ Now, since Augustine says that we can abandon our belief only if we settle a natural phenomenon as “certain from reason and experience,” which we would commonly call “a fact,” and since such a thing cannot ever happen with polygenism, it follows that science cannot—by the very nature of the issue—disprove the belief in a single couple as an exclusive origin of entire humanity. And this is what Augustine means when he says:

When they produce from any of their books a *theory* contrary to Scripture, and therefore contrary to the Catholic faith, . . . at least we ourselves will hold it [absolutely false] without any shadow of doubt. (*De Gen. ad Lit.*, I,21,41)

Ad P2

Kemp rightly refers my claim that Catholic monogenism must include two points: (1) the “real existence of Adam and Eve” and (2) their being “the exclusive origin of humanity.” As much as he concedes to the first point, on the second, he comments: “The second is unclear both concerning its source and to its meaning” (Kemp 2024, 393). I really don’t know what is or may be unclear with respect to the meaning of this point. That Adam and

4. In the case of Galileo the question was “what are the relative movements and positions of the planets?” In the case of human origins the question is “where an entirely new form of life comes from?” I expand on this distinction in another place (Chaberek 2021, 70–78).

5. For those who have a habit of catching on words (which may suggest a lack of better arguments), I haste to explain that by “species” I understand completely new forms of life, not just new variants of existing species. So, yes, speciation, as understood in modern biology, can be observed, but “the origin of species,” as Darwin imagined, cannot.

Eve were the exclusive origin of humanity means (to borrow the terms from older theologians) that there were no “pre-Adamites,” “co-Adamites,” and “post-Adamites,” i.e. that all people that are alive and ever lived, or will ever live, descended from a single pair of Adam and Eve. I really don’t know how to make this point any clearer.

Regarding the source of this truth, Kemp comments that I “do not quote the phrase from anywhere” (2024, 393), and “the documents which I mention as confirming this perspective do not use it” (ibid). So, let us look into some of the sources I referenced.

Pope Pelagius I, in his solemn confession of faith (in 557), included the following statement:

I confess . . . that all men from Adam onward who have been born and have died up to the end of the world will then rise again and stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, together with Adam himself and his wife, who were not born of other parents, but were created: one from the earth and the other from the side of the man. (DS 443)

There are a bunch of relevant claims in this short formula. First of all, the Pope says that our first parents were not born but created. To be born means to have a biological continuity with a parent through biological generation. The Pope puts “to be born” in direct opposition to “to be created” because to be created means not to have any continuity with any previous being and not to be produced by any natural process. It means to be produced directly by God (i.e., without secondary causes), which also means to be produced supernaturally, i.e., outside of the order of nature (or, as some say, *de novo*).

This clearly contradicts Kemp’s claim that Adam and Eve were born from biological humans because this kind of emergence would biologically connect them with their parents.

I presume that Kemp would respond that on his account these parents were non-human. But Pelagius does not say that Adam and Eve did not have human parents. He says, they had no parents, precisely, because he wants to exclude all of the pagan, Gnostic and mythological believes in which first humans emerged by some kind of transformation (as modern evolutionists believe). So Kemp, to save his thesis in the light of Pelagius’ formula, would need to say that they were no parents at all which contradicts the very idea of being born and reduces his argument *ad absurdum*.

Kemp says that in my sources there is no idea of Adam and Eve being an exclusive origin of humanity. So, how would he explain the Papal phrase: “all men from Adam onward who have been born and have died up to the

end of the world will then . . . stand before the judgment-seat of Christ”? If Adam and Eve were not an exclusive origin of humanity, it would follow these other people (outside of Adam’s lineage) would never stand before the judgment-seat of Christ. Is this what Prof. Kemp means? Or does he believe that those other humans were not born? There is much more to Pope Pelagius’s formula, but I will leave it for another occasion.

My adversary seems to believe that none of my sources has any higher “grade of certainty,” therefore they “can be retained, modified or even abandoned under the guidance of the Church’s Magisterium” (Kemp 2024, 397). I am leaving it to my adversary to judge for himself what kind of Magisterial authority has a solemn, public Papal confession of faith, presented to the King with an explicit intention of explaining what the universal Church believes, and then the same creed being proclaimed to all the faithful.⁶

Just as a corollary to this, we should add Pope Pius II’s condemnation of the following statement (1459):

That God created another world than this one, and that in its time many other men and women existed and that consequently Adam was not the first man. (DS 1363)

At least there were no pre-Adamites for sure, which means there could be no humans before Adam, which again, contradicts Kemp’s theory. Surely, he would respond that these biological humans who lived before Adam were no humans, but this is a word game played on an equivocation (see Ad P3 below). The same is the meaning of the Council of Trent, which anathematizes someone who would not confess that “Adam was the first man, etc.” (The Council of Trent, Session V, 1)

Another document that I referenced was the formula pronounced by the Synod of Cologne in 1860. The timing of this pronouncement is significant because it is right about the time when the “evolutionary hypothesis” of human origins started penetrating the minds of Catholic scholars:

Our first parents were created immediately by God. Therefore we declare that the opinion of those who do not fear to assert that this human being, man as regards his body, emerged finally from the spontaneous continuous change of imperfect nature to the more perfect, is clearly opposed to Sacred Scripture and to the Faith. (*Acta*, 30; my translation)

6. The Pope first pronounced it in a letter to king Childebert I (of 3 February 557), and then repeated it in the letter *Vas electionis* addressed to the whole Church.

Again, first parents were created “directly by God,” which means they were not born from either theological or biological humans. I don’t think this formula is reconcilable with Kemp’s account of human origins:

The origin of the human race lies in God’s infusion of two created rational souls into animal bodies that were themselves the product of evolution, but did not necessarily differ in any significant way from those of the other animals in the population into which they were born. (Kemp 2024, 394)

Pope Leo XIII, in his Encyclical *Arcanum* (1880), not only confirms again the special creation of Adam and Eve but also says something quite relevant to our debate:

We record what . . . cannot be doubted by any, that God, . . . having made man from the slime of the earth, and having breathed into his face the breath of life, gave him a companion, whom He miraculously took from the side of Adam when he was locked in sleep. God thus, in His most far-reaching foresight, decreed that this husband and wife should be the natural beginning of the human race, from whom it might be propagated and preserved by an unending fruitfulness throughout all futurity of time. (Leo XIII 1879, 386)

The Pope says that Adam and Eve were designed by God to be “the natural beginning of the human race, from whom it might be propagated . . . throughout all futurity of time.” Does it not mean that there was no natural beginning of humanity other than Adam and Eve? How can we square it with Kemp’s story, in which the natural beginning of humanity is constituted by “biological humans” who are different from Adam and Eve?

I also referenced the 1909 *Responsum* of the PBC on the historicity of Genesis 1–3, in which we read that (among other things) “the special creation of man; the formation of the first woman out of the first man and the unity of the human race” (EB 334) cannot be doubted as “literal and historical” truths revealed in Genesis. Again, “special creation” literally contradicts “natural generation” (on both counts), and, moreover, Kemp’s idea of division into “biological humans” and “theological humans” contradicts the literal and historical meaning of the “unity of the human race” revealed in Genesis.

These are just a few references, and I am not even going into the teachings of the Fathers and Holy Doctors, who obviously taught and argued the same things, oftentimes more explicitly and with more theological and philosophical context. The Magisterial teachings make it clear that no other interpretation than Adam and Eve being the sole origin of humanity is acceptable.

Even so, Prof. Kemp says:

What one finds in those sources is only: (G1) Adam and Eve are fully human and the ancestors of all other (fully) human beings. One can get from G1 only as far as (G2) Adam and Eve are the only fully human beings who are ancestors of all other (fully) human beings.” What he needs for his criticism of my article to succeed is a different, stronger, thesis which is beyond what his sources assert: (G3) Adam and Eve are the only biologically human beings who are ancestors of all other (fully) human beings. (Kemp 2024, 394)

But these claims are based on the false distinction, because there is nothing like “fully” and “non-fully” humans. Biological human is simply non-human (see Ad P3 below). Therefore, the reasoning is flawed. Even so, Kemp rightly points out that the quoted sources secure G1 and G2, but he misses the fact that they secure one more—an even stronger claim—that Adam and Eve were not born of other parents but created directly by God.

Now, given G1 and G2, and the direct creation of Adam and Eve, logically results in G3, because God did not create any organisms with human bodies other than Adam and Eve. In other words, human body (“biological human”) originated only once with Adam and Eve. So, contrary to what Kemp says, even according to his own standards (in my opinion flawed), his thesis is refuted by the documents I referenced.

Ad P3

Prof. Kemp believes that his division into biological human and theological human resolves the problem of an apparent contradiction between P1 and P2:

On that scenario, P1 would be true, understood as referring to the biologically human species . . . P2 would be true, understood as referring to the philosophically human species . . . If the common term, “human being,” means something different in the two propositions, then the two propositions do not contradict one another. (Kemp 2024, 395)

Fair enough. But in his solution he is not “making a distinction when faced with contradiction” (Kemp 2011, 236). Instead, he takes one term in two contradictory meanings, depending on the context. So his solution is based not on a “distinction” but on an “equivocation” that he introduces into the term “human being.” A human being is a rational animal. But “biological human” is a non-rational animal, which means it is not human.

Thus, Kemp in P1 is not referring to the same reality that evolutionists do, and therefore, he does not resolve the contradiction, rather, he introduces a smart confusion. He may trick the audience, but he is not resolving the issue. We can picture it with a different example:

- P1. Scientists say laws are unchangeable.
- P2. Congressmen say laws are changeable.

Now, obviously, if scientists meant “laws of nature” and congressmen meant “juridical laws,” the common term “law” would receive two different meanings, and there would be no contradiction between P1 and P2. But this is not what is going on in Kemp’s P1 and P2. Drawing on this analogy—scientists mean “juridical laws,” which is exactly the same as what congressmen mean, and therefore, there is an actual contradiction. Evolutionists, Darwin and his followers, would not agree that evolution produced just irrational animals (biological humans). Quite the contrary, they believe humans (rational animals) are the product of evolution. Kemp allegedly resolves the contradiction by simply imposing on evolutionists what they do not believe.

Strictly speaking, there is no logical fallacy in Kemp’s argument because playing with the meaning of terms while conducting an argument is different from drawing conclusions which do not follow from premises. We could call Kemp’s argument a paradox akin to the paradoxes of the Ancients, such as the paradox of a bald man or the impossibility of local motion. To my taste, offering a playful paradox as a solution to a specific science-faith problem is somewhat silly and not in keeping with the academic spirit.

However, there is a problem with the flawed metaphysics in his argument. Regrettably, Kemp, while providing a long response, did not use the opportunity to clarify his terms such as: “theological species,” “theological men/humans,” “biological species,” “biologically human,” “genetically human-like,” “genetically human,” “non-intellectual human,” etc. even though prompted (Chaberek 2024, 158). From his other statements, at least now, it is clearer that he basically means one division (biological vs. theological human) and that “biological human” is a human body without the human (i.e. rational soul), instead animated by an animal (i.e., sensitive) soul. Kemp makes several claims to the same effect:

Why would the existence of an additional, intellectual, power require an entirely new kind of eyes, or, more to the point, incompatibly different reproductive organs? (Kemp 2024, 396)

There is no reason to think that those bodily organs would have to be different in order to make . . . abstraction possible. (Kemp 2024, 396)

[Chaberek needs to explain] why a particular disposition of matter could not be capable of being informed by either of two different substantial forms, one that merely actualized the organs of that material body and another that did all that in the same way, but in addition included the power of intellect. (Kemp 2024, 396)

Why could God not create, and infuse into animal bodies . . . a substantial form that does everything that their animal soul did, but adding the intellectual powers that would enable them to abstract concepts from the images that the sense powers make possible as well as to make free choices about how to act? (Kemp 2024, 395)

Well, as I said in my critique, the human body with a non-human soul is impossible for both reasons—biological and metaphysical/theological. First, let's reiterate the theological reasons.

The Council of Vienne and the Fifth Lateran Council established as Catholic doctrine (not just a particular tenet of a philosophical system) that the human soul is the substantial form of the human body:

We define that anyone who presumes henceforth to assert, defend, or hold stubbornly that the rational or intellectual soul is not the form of the human body of itself and essentially, is to be considered a heretic (DS 901). The soul not only truly exists of itself and essentially as the form of the human body, . . . but it is also immortal. (DS 1440)

Prof. Kemp believes that the difference between his biological man and theological man consists in the soul rather than the body. If it was the case, the only difference would be in the soul, which means that the only difference between the two would be non-material, and it would boil down to having the faculty of reason (the theological human) vs. not having the faculty of reason (biological human). But having or not this or other faculty constitutes not a substantial but an accidental difference (even if the faculty is of such prominence as reason). This means that the difference between the two (biological and theological human) consists of an accidental difference, not substantial.

Surely, I grant that Kemp says that there is a new substance in the theological man, but the "novelty" of the "new substance" is reduced to the

faculty of reasoning, which contradicts the very notion of the substantial form. So, he nominally claims that the rational soul is a substantial form, but, actually, he reduces it to a faculty which is an accident. And this means that the difference between the theological and biological man is actually only accidental, which means there is no new substantial form in (theological) human, which contradicts the teachings of the Council of Vienne and Lateran V.

Now, let's reiterate why it is not biologically possible to have a human or almost human body without a rational soul. To understand it, we need to adopt a realistic view of nature and animals, which is missing from Kemp's account. One cannot just "imagine" an animal that "God could have created" (Kemp 2024, 395). We are talking about real scenarios in the real world, and we do not ask what God could have done but what God actually did (since God is omnipotent, there are very few things that He could not have done, and these are contradictions in terms, so theistic evolutionists' favorite the "God could have done it" smacks of tautology). Animals in nature go about their lives (which consist of feeding and propagating) thanks to the natural compositions of their bodies which allow them to prey or avoid becoming an easy prey. Each species has some natural weaponry, such as claws, fur, horns, fangs, shells, etc. And if they do not have assaulting characteristics, they have defensive features. So, for instance, a deer has no claws or fangs but it has great smell and hearing, can run swiftly, and, according to its instinct, it is always as if on the lookout. Wherever we look into the animal kingdom, we see all kinds of adaptations to survivability. These adaptations are a condition *sine qua non* for each species to survive in nature.

But humans are the only animals that have no such characteristics in their bodily constitution, neither offensive nor defensive. In fact, humans have a universal, "unadapted" body. So, how is it possible that humans not only survive but thrive, not only thrive but excel many animals in most conditions? This is due to reason—the faculty of thinking which allows us to invent and make all kinds of tools, shelters, and weapons. The reality, therefore, is that either an animal is non-rational—and then it has all kinds of adaptations in its bodily structure, or it has no such adaptations, and then it has to be rational in order to make up for the relative deficiencies of its body. A clear example of it is seen between chimps and humans, according to evolutionists—our "closest cousins." Chimps (unlike humans) have prehensile feet and hands (which adapt them to tree climbing), extraordinary strength in their hands and legs, they have fur (which protects them against weather conditions, insects, etc.), they are quadrupeds, which makes their locomotion energetically more effective, and many more.

Now, Prof. Kemp proposes that there was an animal that had a human body, i.e., unadapted, unspecialized, and yet the animal was deprived of reason. Such a thing is dead in the water. It is biologically impossible. Could God have created such a thing? Obviously, He could. Would it survive in nature? It wouldn't. Could God have changed the entire natural order to allow it to survive? Surely, God could have created an entirely different natural order, as well as an entirely different world. But this is not what we learn from science, and—granting that God does not delude us—we have evidence that this was not the case. So, outside of Prof. Kemp's imagination, such a thing as "biological human" never existed and could never exist in our world.

Additionally, these biological facts explain "why a particular disposition of matter could not be capable of being informed by either of two different substantial forms" (Kemp 2024, 396). In fact, these facts shed a lot of light on how one should understand the substantial form, which is the human soul, and what it actually takes to create a disposition in matter for receiving an entirely new kind of substantial form. When God infused the soul into Adam, He created his body from scratch in order to make it adapted to the requirements of the rational soul. Humans differ so much from animals because our bodies are adapted to perform rational functions. This is helped by many qualities of the human body, including the erect posture, free hands (in basic locomotion), an opposite thumb, very skillful hands with highly specific finger coordination, and the great harmony between the senses, just to name a few. All of these obvious differences between brutes and humans are completely ignored and/or inexplicable on Kemp's account.

Ad P4

I already made comments on the alleged need for a revision of Catholic theology due to "scientific polygenism." There is no such need. So, we should turn to theology. Prof. Kemp spends some time on explaining that there are different grades of certainty among theological theses and "While there are truths that it would be heretical to deny, there are others the denial of which would not be heretical, but would still be rash" (2024, 397) Surely, these are non-controversial claims, but these are spandrels. It really does not matter which level of theological certainty (out of twenty or so) one attaches to a given testimony if there is nothing on the opposite side. The arch question is not how "infallible" and "unchangeable" are the documents quoted in P2 but whether there is better support for polygenism or monogenism in Church teachings, tradition, and the Bible. There is not a single Magisterial document supporting polygenism. On the

contrary, Catholic evolutionists' favorite document, the 1950 encyclical *Humani Generis*, does not even allow for discussions on polygenism. How Catholic evolutionists (such as Kemp) go about it without a blink of an eye is a mystery.

Given that science does not require any modification from theology (See P1) there is no reason to even begin an enterprise like the one proposed by Prof. Kemp. And this is why I said his understanding of science and faith was unhealthy and that he judged theology by science, giving science undue priority, while misquoting Augustine, who proposed an exact opposite. (Kemp writes he said no such things (2024, 397), but I did not claim that he said it; rather, it was an overall conclusion from his different proposals). Giving science priority when it has not and cannot settle the matter in question, at the same time ignoring the overwhelming teachings of Magisterial documents, holy Fathers, and Doctors, is unhealthy, to say the least.

We should also take a more general note on the question of truth. The Church has condemned on multiple occasions a belief that there can be a contradiction between philosophical (which includes scientific) truth and truth of faith. This condemnation stems from a rather common-sense conviction that since God is the Author of both nature and Scripture there would be no contradictions between the two. Regardless, Prof. Kemp consistently draws on distinctions such as “biological human” vs. “theological human.” Does it mean that humanity (what he calls “full” or “true” humanity) is scientifically undetectable? If it is detectable, then how? If the real humans (theological) differ from the non-real humans (biological) only by their soul, then how can the difference be scientifically established?

Obviously, science defines humans as humans based on biological features—humans are those that have the human genome, the human phenotype, and are born from other humans. But on Kemp's account, one cannot tell the difference, because biological and theological humans are biologically identical.⁷ I am not even mentioning any of the moral problems that come with his ideas.

7. Kemp could respond that scientists could establish the difference by, e.g., detecting in “theological humans” the ability to formulate rational thought such as the one we find in the human language. But on this account theological humans, who by any chance cannot speak, or articulate intelligent thoughts (as it happens with many mental disorders) could not be qualified as theological humans.

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